

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

20 February 1951

SUBJECT: SUGGESTED ADDITION TO PARAGRAPH 1, DISCUSSION,  
PAGE 4 OF NIE-29: YUGOSLAVIA

Soviet control of Yugoslavia would greatly facilitate Soviet efforts to dominate the Eastern Mediterranean area and would eliminate a dangerous salient in the southeast European front of the Soviet bloc. Yugoslavia offers an approach for Soviet attacks into Greece or Italy, and is a potential threat to the southern flank of any Soviet advance into Western Europe. Moreover, and probably more basic in Communist calculations, the continued survival of the Tito government as the only Communist regime not subservient to Moscow is an ideological threat to the Kremlin's control of the world Communist movement. Both the Kremlin and the Tito government apparently consider the potential effects of the split in the Communist movement to be of critical importance to the USSR.

DOCUMENT NO. \_\_\_\_\_  
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. ☐  
☐ DECLASSIFIED  
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S ⑥/991  
NEXT REVIEW DATE: \_\_\_\_\_  
AUTH: HR 70-2  
DATE: 27 Feb 81 REVIEWER: 006514

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

20 February 1951

SUBJECT: REVISION OF NIE-29: YUGOSLAVIA

7. If the Kremlin calculated that a Soviet or Satellite ground or conventional air attack upon Yugoslavia would result in a US atomic counter-attack upon the USSR and/or Satellites, the Kremlin would in all probability delay action.

8. However, the Kremlin might estimate that the US itself would not counter-attack with atomic bombs for the following reasons in ascending order of importance:

(a) The US would not want to carry the onus of initiating atomic war in any circumstances;

(b) The US would not want to carry the onus of initiating atomic war in behalf of Tito who is a Communist and who in 1946 ordered the shooting down of unarmed US aircraft which had accidentally crossed his frontiers;

(c) The US government could not jeopardize its key target cities to Soviet atomic retaliation until it had more fully prepared its people psychologically for all-out war -- especially such a war in behalf of Tito -- and until it had

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DOCUMENT NO. \_\_\_\_\_  
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. ☐  
☐ DECLASSIFIED  
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C  
NEXT REVIEW DATE: \_\_\_\_\_  
AUTH: HR 70-2  
REVIEWER: 006514

**CONFIDENTIAL**

improved its civil defense.

9. If, in these circumstances, the Kremlin estimated that it could upset the Tito regime by invasion of Yugoslavia with conventional arms and not precipitate atomic war with the US, it would do so either with Soviet or Satellite forces.

10. It might decide to use Soviet forces exclusively or in combination with Satellite forces to assure the speediest victory possible.

11. On the other hand, the Kremlin might use only Satellite forces and thus maintain an added flexibility of action. Should the Satellite attack be speedily successful, the Kremlin would confront the world with a fait accompli without itself having been directly involved. But should the Satellite attack be stalled by Yugoslav resistance, the Kremlin would have time to gauge western reaction and the freedom to choose between its own outright intervention, its clandestine support of the Satellites (another Korea), or a face-saving withdrawal and offer of mediatory services in the threat of a US ultimatum.

**CONFIDENTIAL**